考虑决策主体社会偏好的旅游供应链定价策略研究

doi:10.12054/lydk.bisu.172

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文建立了由一个占主导地位的主题公园和一个处于跟随地位的旅行社组成的旅游供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,引入供应链成员的社会偏好特征,研究不同社会偏好对旅游供应链定价策略和利润的差异化影响。结果表明：仅考虑旅行社的公平偏好时,主题公园批发价格和利润降低,旅行社的销售价格不变、利润增加,旅游供应链整体利润不变;仅考虑主题公园利他偏好时,主题公园批发价格和利润降低,旅行社销售价格降低、利润增加,旅游供应链整体利润增加;同时考虑二者的社会偏好时,所得结论与仅考虑主题公园利他偏好情形一致。旅行社的公平偏好仅对自身有利,而主题公园的利他偏好对旅行社和旅游供应链整体都有利。因此,从维护供应链合作关系和供应链整体利益最大化角度,作为主导者的主题公园应该关注旅行社的公平偏好并主动采取利他行为。

关键词: 公平偏好; 利他偏好; 旅游供应链; 定价策略; Stackelberg博弈

Abstract:

To explore the impact of the decision-maker's social preference on the pricing strategy of the tourism supply chain, a Stackelberg game model for a tourism supply chain is established, composed of a theme park and a travel agency. The social preference of supply chain members is introduced into the model. The paper analyzes the influence of different social preferences on pricing strategy and profit of the tourism supply chain, in the case of a theme park dominating the supply chain. The results show: 1) Only considering the fairness preference of the travel agency reduces the wholesale price and the profit of the theme park; the selling price of the travel agency remains unchanged, the profit of the travel agency increases, and the overall profit of the tourism supply chain remains unchanged. 2) Only considering the altruistic preference of the theme park reduces the wholesale price and profit of the theme park and the selling price of the travel agency, and the profits of the travel agency and the tourism supply chain increase. 3) Both members having social preferences leads to conclusions consistent with the case of considering only the theme park's altruistic preference. 4) The fairness preference of the travel agency only benefits itself, while the altruistic preference of the theme park benefits both the travel agency and the tourism supply chain. Therefore, from the perspective of maintaining the supply chain's cooperative relationships and maximizing its overall benefits, the theme park as the dominant player should pay attention to the fairness preference of the travel agency and take the initiative to adopt altruistic behaviors.

Keywords: fairness preference; altruistic preference; tourism supply chain; pricing strategy; Stackelberg game

林强. 考虑决策主体社会偏好的旅游供应链定价策略研究[J]. 旅游导刊, 2021, 5(3): 64-89.

LIN Qiang. Research on Pricing Strategy of Tourism Supply Chain Based on Social Preference Theory[J]. Tourism and Hospitality Prospects, 2021, 5(3): 64-89.

图/表 8

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符号 Symbols	说明 Instruction
w_i (i = e,l)	主题公园的批发价格,且w_l > w_e
c_i (i = e,l)	主题公园的单位成本,且c_l = c_e + c
p_i (i = e,l)	旅行社的销售价格,且p_l > p_e
v	包价游产品给游客带来的基本价值
s_i (i = e,l)	游客消费包价游产品的实际体验,且s_l>s_e
θ ~ U (0,1)	不同游客的差异性偏好,服从[0,1]上的均匀分布
u_i (i = e,l)	游客消费包价游产品的效用
D_i (i = e,l)	包价游产品的市场需求函数
u_j = ( j = tp,ta)	主题公园或旅行社的效用函数
π_j = ( j = tp,ta,tsc)	主题公园、旅行社和旅游供应链整体的利润函数

符号 Symbols	说明 Instruction
w_i (i = e,l)	主题公园的批发价格,且w_l > w_e
c_i (i = e,l)	主题公园的单位成本,且c_l = c_e + c
p_i (i = e,l)	旅行社的销售价格,且p_l > p_e
v	包价游产品给游客带来的基本价值
s_i (i = e,l)	游客消费包价游产品的实际体验,且s_l>s_e
θ ~ U (0,1)	不同游客的差异性偏好,服从[0,1]上的均匀分布
u_i (i = e,l)	游客消费包价游产品的效用
D_i (i = e,l)	包价游产品的市场需求函数
u_j = ( j = tp,ta)	主题公园或旅行社的效用函数
π_j = ( j = tp,ta,tsc)	主题公园、旅行社和旅游供应链整体的利润函数

α	w_e	w_l	p_e	p_l	π_tp	π_ta	π_tsc
0	30.00	39.00	42.5	54.5	10.13	5.06	15.19
0.2	26.43	34.57	42.5	54.5	8.68	6.51	15.19
0.4	24.44	32.11	42.5	54.5	7.88	7.32	15.19
0.6	23.18	30.55	42.5	54.5	7.37	7.83	15.19
0.8	22.31	29.46	42.5	54.5	7.01	8.18	15.19
1	21.67	28.67	42.5	54.5	6.75	8.44	15.19
2	20.00	26.60	42.5	54.5	6.08	9.12	15.19

α	w_e	w_l	p_e	p_l	π_tp	π_ta	π_tsc
0	30.00	39.00	42.5	54.5	10.13	5.06	15.19
0.2	26.43	34.57	42.5	54.5	8.68	6.51	15.19
0.4	24.44	32.11	42.5	54.5	7.88	7.32	15.19
0.6	23.18	30.55	42.5	54.5	7.37	7.83	15.19
0.8	22.31	29.46	42.5	54.5	7.01	8.18	15.19
1	21.67	28.67	42.5	54.5	6.75	8.44	15.19
2	20.00	26.60	42.5	54.5	6.08	9.12	15.19

β	w_e	w_l	p_e	p_l	π_tp	π_ta	π_tsc
0	30.00	39.00	42.50	54.50	10.13	5.06	15.19
0.2	27.22	35.56	41.11	52.78	10.00	6.25	16.26
0.4	23.75	31.25	39.38	50.63	9.50	7.91	17.41
0.6	19.29	25.71	37.14	47.86	8.27	10.34	18.60
0.8	13.33	18.33	34.17	44.17	5.63	14.07	19.69
1	5.00	8.00	30.00	39.00	0.00	20.26	20.26