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旅游导刊 ›› 2021, Vol. 5 ›› Issue (3): 64-89.DOI: 10.12054/lydk.bisu.172

• 研究论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑决策主体社会偏好的旅游供应链定价策略研究

林强()   

  1. 重庆第二师范学院婴幼产品与服务供应链研究中心 重庆 400067
  • 收稿日期:2020-09-10 修回日期:2021-03-30 出版日期:2021-06-30 发布日期:2021-07-14
  • 作者简介:林 强(1988— ),男,河南信阳人,博士研究生,重庆第二师范学院讲师,研究方向:旅游供应链管理。E-mail: lqgood_7024@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目“基于产品可靠性与顾客服务期望的网购供应链延保决策及模式研究”(71802031);重庆市社会科学规划培育项目“有限理性视角下可追溯食品供应链决策分析与协调机制研究”(2019PY46);重庆市教委人文社会科学研究项目“一带一路背景下重庆文化旅游公示语英语翻译规范化研究”(17SKG215)

Research on Pricing Strategy of Tourism Supply Chain Based on Social Preference Theory

LIN Qiang()   

  1. Research Center for Infant Products and Services Supply Chain, Chongqing University of Education, Chongqing 400067, China
  • Received:2020-09-10 Revised:2021-03-30 Online:2021-06-30 Published:2021-07-14

摘要:

本文建立了由一个占主导地位的主题公园和一个处于跟随地位的旅行社组成的旅游供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,引入供应链成员的社会偏好特征,研究不同社会偏好对旅游供应链定价策略和利润的差异化影响。结果表明:仅考虑旅行社的公平偏好时,主题公园批发价格和利润降低,旅行社的销售价格不变、利润增加,旅游供应链整体利润不变;仅考虑主题公园利他偏好时,主题公园批发价格和利润降低,旅行社销售价格降低、利润增加,旅游供应链整体利润增加;同时考虑二者的社会偏好时,所得结论与仅考虑主题公园利他偏好情形一致。旅行社的公平偏好仅对自身有利,而主题公园的利他偏好对旅行社和旅游供应链整体都有利。因此,从维护供应链合作关系和供应链整体利益最大化角度,作为主导者的主题公园应该关注旅行社的公平偏好并主动采取利他行为。

关键词: 公平偏好, 利他偏好, 旅游供应链, 定价策略, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract:

To explore the impact of the decision-maker's social preference on the pricing strategy of the tourism supply chain, a Stackelberg game model for a tourism supply chain is established, composed of a theme park and a travel agency. The social preference of supply chain members is introduced into the model. The paper analyzes the influence of different social preferences on pricing strategy and profit of the tourism supply chain, in the case of a theme park dominating the supply chain. The results show: 1) Only considering the fairness preference of the travel agency reduces the wholesale price and the profit of the theme park; the selling price of the travel agency remains unchanged, the profit of the travel agency increases, and the overall profit of the tourism supply chain remains unchanged. 2) Only considering the altruistic preference of the theme park reduces the wholesale price and profit of the theme park and the selling price of the travel agency, and the profits of the travel agency and the tourism supply chain increase. 3) Both members having social preferences leads to conclusions consistent with the case of considering only the theme park's altruistic preference. 4) The fairness preference of the travel agency only benefits itself, while the altruistic preference of the theme park benefits both the travel agency and the tourism supply chain. Therefore, from the perspective of maintaining the supply chain's cooperative relationships and maximizing its overall benefits, the theme park as the dominant player should pay attention to the fairness preference of the travel agency and take the initiative to adopt altruistic behaviors.

Key words: fairness preference, altruistic preference, tourism supply chain, pricing strategy, Stackelberg game