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旅游导刊 ›› 2021, Vol. 5 ›› Issue (5): 52-86.DOI: 10.12054/lydk.bisu.175

• 研究论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

旅游供应链企业社会责任传导效应与决策优化——基于权力结构的博弈分析框架

廉吉全()   

  1. 中山大学旅游学院 广东广州 510275
  • 收稿日期:2020-10-08 修回日期:2021-02-28 发布日期:2021-10-27
  • 作者简介:廉吉全(1994— ),男,山东临沂人,中山大学旅游学院博士研究生,研究方向:旅游经济学、旅游供应链管理。E-mail:lianjq3@mail2.sysu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    本研究受教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“基于供应中断的供应链协调机制研究”(项目编号)(17YJA630046);本研究受教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“基于供应中断的供应链协调机制研究”(项目编号)(17YJA630046);亚热带建筑科学国家重点实验室开放研究基金项目(项目编号)(20201231);亚热带建筑科学国家重点实验室开放研究基金项目(项目编号)(20201231)

Corporate Social Responsibility Transmission Effect and Decision Optimization in Tourism Supply Chain: A Game Analysis Framework Based on Power Structures

LIAN Jiquan()   

  1. School of Tourism Management, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
  • Received:2020-10-08 Revised:2021-02-28 Published:2021-10-27

摘要:

旅游企业社会责任(CSR)关乎优质旅游产品供给、旅游体验质量和可持续旅游发展。CSR缺失带来各种危机风险和压力沿供应链交互传导,而当前旅游CSR研究缺乏旅游供应链层级企业互动博弈策略的考量,使其无法匹配实践诉求并导致CSR履行低效。本文构建一个考虑CSR的景区和旅行社构成的两级旅游供应链,基于不同权力结构,分别求解了景区主导的主从(Stackelberg)博弈、旅行社主导的Stackelberg博弈、景区和旅行社间存在的纳什(Nash)均衡,以及集中式决策情境下的最优均衡策略。分析发现各权力结构下的旅游产品定价、需求量、景区CSR承担水平、旅行社及供应链的利润、非Nash均衡下的景区利润均随CSR效应的提升而增加,Nash均衡下景区利润随CSR效应的提升呈先增后减的动态变化;景区CSR承担水平在集中决策下最高,在景区主导下最低;当CSR效应因子超过某一临界值时,旅行社主导下的批发价将高于景区主导;集中决策优于分散决策,在分散决策下,景区主导的旅游供应链系统利润最低;旅行社处于主导地位对其自身最优,若CSR效应较高,则对旅游供应链系统也最为有利,而景区处于主导地位对其自身不一定最优,应视CSR效应的大小而定。通过建模优化研究,本文开拓了旅游CSR的研究视角和方法,为不同权力结构下旅游供给侧的CSR实践提供一定的决策支持。

关键词: 旅游供应链, 企业社会责任, 权力结构, 博弈论, 旅游可持续发展

Abstract:

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is closely bound up with the supply of quality tourism products, the quality of tourism experiences, and the sustainable development of tourism. The various crisis risks and pressures that CSR failure causes are transmitted through the supply chain. However, tourism CSR research lacks literature on thinking about the decision-making game process between enterprises, from the perspective of the tourism supply chain system. The lack of systematic optimization decision theory leads to the backward practice of tourism CSR. Breaking the boundary of thinking about CSR from a purely static enterprise perspective to place CSR within the framework of a tourism supply chain dynamic operation establishes a new and robust theoretical analysis path for tourism CSR research that promotes matching tourism CSR research and practice. Utilizing different power structures, this paper studies four models of tourism supply chain game decision-making: the Stackelberg game of scenic-spot leadership, the Stackelberg game of travel agency leadership, the Nash equilibrium game of scenic spot and travel agency, and the centralized decision-making model of complete cooperation in a two-level tourism supply chain, comprising a travel agency and a scenic spot considering CSR. Further, through the equilibrium decision comparative static analysis and the example simulation analysis, this paper found that tourism products’ wholesale price, sale price, and demand, the CSR commitment level of the scenic spot, the scenic-spot profit in a Nash equilibrium game, and the profits of the travel agency and the supply chain will increase. With increased CSR effect, the profit of the scenic spot under the Nash equilibrium game presents a dynamic change from increase to decrease as the CSR effect. The CSR commitment level of the scenic spot is highest under the centralized decision-making model, and minimal in the scenic-spot leadership model. When the CSR effect factor exceeds a critical value, the travel agency will respond to scenic spot’s fairness concerns. Hence, the wholesale price of products under the leadership of the travel agency will be higher than under the leadership of the scenic spot. Centralized decision-making is better than decentralized decision-making, and under decentralized decision-making, the optimal profit of the tourism supply chain under scenic-spot leadership is the lowest. That is, the optimal profit of the tourism supply chain under travel-agency leadership and the balance of power on both sides is better than under scenic spots. Therefore, when forming a centralized decision with full cooperation is impossible, having the travel agency in a leading position is most beneficial. Strong CSR effect is also most beneficial for the tourism supply chain system. However, from the perspective of its own profits, the scenic spot’s leading position is not necessarily the most advantageous, and the size of the CSR effect should determine that. Through modeling optimization research, tourism CSR and channel power are both introduced into the decision-making model of the tourism supply chain for the first time. This develops the research perspective and method of tourism CSR and, at the same time, provides some decision support for CSR practice on the tourism supply side, under different power structures.

Key words: tourism supply chain, corporate social responsibility, authority structure, game theory, sustainable tourism development