Research on the Coordination Mechanism of Value Co-Creation Behavior of Intangible Cultural Heritage Tourism Integration Based on Evolutionary Game

doi:10.12054/lydk.bisu.296

Abstract

Abstract:

The integration of intangible cultural heritage (ICH) and tourism is the main driving force for high-quality tourism development. In view of the problems of unreasonable benefit distribution and low participation of ICH inheritors in the benefit maximization of ICH tourism, which restrict the integrated development and value co-creation, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of value co-creation between tourism enterprises and ICH inheritors and discusses the factors influencing value co-creation behavior. The study introduces cost-sharing and reward-and-punishment mechanisms to coordinate the value co-creation behavior of the two parties, which has important guiding significance for promoting high-quality tourism development in China. This study found that (1) value co-creation of ICH tourism integration is influenced by synergistic benefits, and the proportionate distribution, integration and development costs, spillover benefits, etc.; (2) when the integration cost, synergistic benefit, and spillover benefit of both parties meet certain conditions, the introduction of a cost-sharing mechanism can significantly improve the realization probability of value co-creation; (3) the introduction of a reward-and-punishment mechanism on the basis of cost-sharing can effectively promote the coordination of value co-creation between the two parties in the game. Both government subsidies and fines have a positive impact on the integrated development behavior of the two parties. When the synergistic benefits are greater than the sum of the spillover benefits of tourism enterprises and inheritors, liquidated damages can effectively promote the integrated value co-creation of ICH tourism.

Key words: intangible cultural heritage tourism, value co-creation, coordination mechanism, evolutionary game

摘要：

非物质文化遗产与旅游融合是推动旅游业高质量发展的重要动力之一。针对非遗旅游发展进程中相关主体在追求自身利益最大化时出现的利益分配失衡、非遗传承人参与度低等制约融合发展与价值共创的问题，本文构建了旅游企业与非遗传承人的价值共创演化博弈模型，探讨了价值共创行为的影响因素，并引入成本分担与奖惩机制，探索协调旅游企业与非遗传承人的价值共创行为的有效路径，这对促进我国旅游业高质量发展具有重要的指导意义。研究结果显示：非遗旅游融合价值共创行为受协同收益与分配比例、融合发展成本、溢出收益等因素显著影响；当双方融合成本、协同收益与溢出收益满足特定条件时，引入成本分担机制可显著提升价值共创实现概率；在成本分担机制基础上引入奖惩机制，能有效促进博弈双方价值共创的协同，其中，政府补贴与政府罚款均正向影响博弈双方的融合发展行为，且当协同收益大于旅游企业与传承人的溢出收益之和时，违约金能有效推动非遗旅游融合价值共创的实现。

关键词: 非遗旅游, 价值共创, 协调机制, 演化博弈

CLC Number:

SHI Pingping, YAN Boli, ZHANG Linlin, WANG Jiamin. Research on the Coordination Mechanism of Value Co-Creation Behavior of Intangible Cultural Heritage Tourism Integration Based on Evolutionary Game[J]. Tourism and Hospitality Prospects, 2025, 9(6): 21-46.

时萍萍, 阎柏吏, 张琳嶙, 王嘉敏. 基于演化博弈的非遗旅游融合价值共创行为的协调机制研究[J]. 旅游导刊, 2025, 9(6): 21-46.

Figures/Tables 17

Tab. 1 Behavior of ICH tourism integration value co-creation in some regions

案例 Case	旅游企业行为 The behavior of tourism enterprises	传承人行为 The behavior of the inheritors
丹寨万达小镇 Danzhai Wanda Village	为传承人提供平台、对外宣传、举办非遗活动、订购非遗产品；用非遗元素产品装饰店铺、酒店、街道等场所	入住小镇，向企业缴纳租金；以非遗文化吸引游客，为企业增添文化色彩
西双版纳勐景来村落 Xishuangbanna Mengjinglai Village	对非遗旅游实现规范化的旅游开发，出资赞助非遗展演和傣族非遗文化陈列馆，引入新的非遗表现形式	在节庆时候策划并参加相应的活动，自发打造非遗体验场所，使全村处处皆体现出非遗文化
融水苗族自治县 Rongshui Miao Autonomous County	整合民族文化与旅游资源，挖掘消费者潜在需求，对非遗旅游资源进行综合性开发，将非遗元素融入旅游产品，提升产品附加值	为非遗旅游产品注入灵魂，形成独一无二的竞争优势，在非遗旅游融合发展中提供丰富的非遗资源、高超的技艺手法
洛阳市的洛邑古城、西安市的永兴坊、韩城市的韩城古城 Luoyi Ancient City in Luoyang City, Yongxingfang in Xi’an City, Hancheng Ancient City	丰富产品体系；通过与传承人达成合作经营、盈利分成等合作模式，实现与非遗传承人的利益共享；吸引传承人开设工作坊，与传承人共同组成非遗旅游产品的供给方	与游客互动，通过文化介绍、产品介绍、信息互动，展现文化内涵；提升对市场需求的研判准确度，通过产品创新吸引游客

Fig. 1 Interaction in value co-creation through ICH tourism integration

Tab. 2 Payoff matrix of tourism enterprises and ICH inheritors under the benchmark model

策略选择 Strategy selection	非遗传承人融合发展（y） ICH inheritor: Integrated development (y)	传承人独立发展（1-y） ICH inheritor: Independent development (1-y)
旅游企业融合发展（x） Tourism enterprise: Integrated development (x)	$R 1 + n R - C 1 R 2 + (1 - n) R - C 2$	$R 1 - C 1 R 2 + E 2$
旅游企业独立发展（1-x） Tourism enterprise: Independent development (1-x)	$R 1 + E 1 R 2 - C 2$	$R 1 R 2$

Tab. 2 Payoff matrix of tourism enterprises and ICH inheritors under the benchmark model

策略选择 Strategy selection	非遗传承人融合发展（y） ICH inheritor: Integrated development (y)	传承人独立发展（1-y） ICH inheritor: Independent development (1-y)
旅游企业融合发展（x） Tourism enterprise: Integrated development (x)	$R 1 + n R - C 1 R 2 + (1 - n) R - C 2$	$R 1 - C 1 R 2 + E 2$
旅游企业独立发展（1-x） Tourism enterprise: Independent development (1-x)	$R 1 + E 1 R 2 - C 2$	$R 1 R 2$

Tab. 3 Stability analysis of equilibrium points in the benchmark model

均衡点 Equilibrium point	特征值 $λ 1$ 、 $λ 2$ Eigenvalues $λ 1$ , $λ 2$	符号 Sign	稳定性 Stability
$A 0,0$	$- C 1, - C 2$	（-,-）	ESS
$B 0,1$	$n R - E 1 - C 1, C 2$	（+,+）	不稳定点
$C 1,0$	$C 1, (1 - n) R - E 2 - C 2$	（+,+）	不稳定点
$D 1,1$	$- n R + E 1 + C 1, (n - 1 R + E 2 + C 2$	（-,-）	ESS

Tab. 3 Stability analysis of equilibrium points in the benchmark model

均衡点 Equilibrium point	特征值 $λ 1$ 、 $λ 2$ Eigenvalues $λ 1$ , $λ 2$	符号 Sign	稳定性 Stability
$A 0,0$	$- C 1, - C 2$	（-,-）	ESS
$B 0,1$	$n R - E 1 - C 1, C 2$	（+,+）	不稳定点
$C 1,0$	$C 1, (1 - n) R - E 2 - C 2$	（+,+）	不稳定点
$D 1,1$	$- n R + E 1 + C 1, (n - 1 R + E 2 + C 2$	（-,-）	ESS

Fig. 2 Evolutionary path of ICH tourism integration under the benchmark model

Tab. 4 Payoff matrix for tourism enterprises and ICH inheritors under cost-sharing

策略选择 Strategy selection	非遗传承人融合发展（y） ICH inheritor: Integrated development (y)	非遗传承人独立发展（1-y） ICH inheritor: Independent development (1-y)
旅游企业融合发展（x） Tourism enterprise: Integrated development (x)	$R 1 + n R - C 1 - a C 2 R 2 + (1 - n) R - 1 - a) C 2$	$R 1 - C 1 R 2 + E 2$
旅游企业独立发展（1-x） Tourism enterprise: Independent development (1-x)	$R 1 + E 1 R 2 - C 2$	$R 1 R 2$

Tab. 4 Payoff matrix for tourism enterprises and ICH inheritors under cost-sharing

策略选择 Strategy selection	非遗传承人融合发展（y） ICH inheritor: Integrated development (y)	非遗传承人独立发展（1-y） ICH inheritor: Independent development (1-y)
旅游企业融合发展（x） Tourism enterprise: Integrated development (x)	$R 1 + n R - C 1 - a C 2 R 2 + (1 - n) R - 1 - a) C 2$	$R 1 - C 1 R 2 + E 2$
旅游企业独立发展（1-x） Tourism enterprise: Independent development (1-x)	$R 1 + E 1 R 2 - C 2$	$R 1 R 2$

Tab. 5 Stability analysis of equilibrium points under cost-sharing

均衡点 Equilibrium point	特征值 $λ 1$ 、 $λ 2$ Eigenvalues $λ 1$ , $λ 2$	符号 Sign	稳定性 Stability
$A 0,0$	$- C 1 ， - C 2$	（-,-）	ESS
$B 0,1$	$- a C 2 + n R - E 1 - C 1, C 2$	（+,+）	不稳定点
$C 1,0$	$C 1, a C 2 + (1 - n) R - E 2 - C 2$	（+,+）	不稳定点
$D 1,1$	$a C 2 - n R + E 1 + C 1, - a C 2 - 1 - n) R + E 2 + C 2$	（-,-）	ESS

Tab. 5 Stability analysis of equilibrium points under cost-sharing

均衡点 Equilibrium point	特征值 $λ 1$ 、 $λ 2$ Eigenvalues $λ 1$ , $λ 2$	符号 Sign	稳定性 Stability
$A 0,0$	$- C 1 ， - C 2$	（-,-）	ESS
$B 0,1$	$- a C 2 + n R - E 1 - C 1, C 2$	（+,+）	不稳定点
$C 1,0$	$C 1, a C 2 + (1 - n) R - E 2 - C 2$	（+,+）	不稳定点
$D 1,1$	$a C 2 - n R + E 1 + C 1, - a C 2 - 1 - n) R + E 2 + C 2$	（-,-）	ESS

Fig. 3 Comparison of evolutionary paths under the benchmark model and cost-sharing scenario

Tab. 6 Payoff matrix for tourism enterprises and ICH inheritors under cost-sharing and reward-penalty mechanisms

策略选择 Strategy selection	传承人融合发展（y） ICH inheritor: Integrated development (y)	传承人独立发展（1-y） ICH inheritor: Independent development (1-y)
旅游企业融合发展（x） Tourism enterprise: Integrated development (x)	$R 1 + n R - C 1 - a C 2 + G 1 R 2 + (1 - n) R - 1 - a) C 2 + G 2$	$R 1 - C 1 + G 1 + T R 2 + E 2 - P 2 - T$
旅游企业独立发展（1-x） Tourism enterprise: Independent development (1-x)	$R 1 + E 1 - P 1 - T$ $R 2 - C 2 + G 2 + T$	$R 1 - P 1 R 2 - P 2$

Tab. 6 Payoff matrix for tourism enterprises and ICH inheritors under cost-sharing and reward-penalty mechanisms

策略选择 Strategy selection	传承人融合发展（y） ICH inheritor: Integrated development (y)	传承人独立发展（1-y） ICH inheritor: Independent development (1-y)
旅游企业融合发展（x） Tourism enterprise: Integrated development (x)	$R 1 + n R - C 1 - a C 2 + G 1 R 2 + (1 - n) R - 1 - a) C 2 + G 2$	$R 1 - C 1 + G 1 + T R 2 + E 2 - P 2 - T$
旅游企业独立发展（1-x） Tourism enterprise: Independent development (1-x)	$R 1 + E 1 - P 1 - T$ $R 2 - C 2 + G 2 + T$	$R 1 - P 1 R 2 - P 2$

Tab. 7 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix under cost-sharing and reward-penalty mechanisms

均衡点 Equilibrium point	特征值 $λ 1$ 、 $λ 2$ Eigenvalues $λ 1$ , $λ 2$
$A 0,0$	$- C 1 + G 1 + T + P 1 ， - C 2 + G 2 + T + P 2$
$B 0,1$	$- a C 2 + n R - E 1 - C 1 + G 1 + T + P 1, C 2 - G 2 - T - P 2$
$C 1,0$	$C 1 - G 1 - T - P 1 ， a C 2 + (1 - n) R - E 2 - C 2 + G 2 + T + P 2$
$D 1,1$	$a C 2 - n R + E 1 + C 1 - G 1 - T - P 1 ， - a C 2 - 1 - n) R + E 2 + C 2 - G 2 - T - P 2$

Tab. 7 Eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix under cost-sharing and reward-penalty mechanisms

均衡点 Equilibrium point	特征值 $λ 1$ 、 $λ 2$ Eigenvalues $λ 1$ , $λ 2$
$A 0,0$	$- C 1 + G 1 + T + P 1 ， - C 2 + G 2 + T + P 2$
$B 0,1$	$- a C 2 + n R - E 1 - C 1 + G 1 + T + P 1, C 2 - G 2 - T - P 2$
$C 1,0$	$C 1 - G 1 - T - P 1 ， a C 2 + (1 - n) R - E 2 - C 2 + G 2 + T + P 2$
$D 1,1$	$a C 2 - n R + E 1 + C 1 - G 1 - T - P 1 ， - a C 2 - 1 - n) R + E 2 + C 2 - G 2 - T - P 2$

Tab. 8 Stability analysis of equilibrium points under the condition of a C 2 - n R + E 1 0 , ? ? C 1 - G 1 - T - P 1 0

均衡点 Equilibrium point	特征值 $λ 1$ Eigenvalue $λ 1$	特征值 $λ 2$ Eigenvalue $λ 2$	稳定性 Stability
$A 0,0$	+	-	不稳定点
$B 0,1$	-	+	不稳定点
$C 1,0$	-	+	不稳定点
$D 1,1$	+	-	不稳定点

Tab. 8 Stability analysis of equilibrium points under the condition of a C 2 - n R + E 1 0 , ? ? C 1 - G 1 - T - P 1 0

均衡点 Equilibrium point	特征值 $λ 1$ Eigenvalue $λ 1$	特征值 $λ 2$ Eigenvalue $λ 2$	稳定性 Stability
$A 0,0$	+	-	不稳定点
$B 0,1$	-	+	不稳定点
$C 1,0$	-	+	不稳定点
$D 1,1$	+	-	不稳定点

Tab. 9 Stability analysis of equilibrium points under the condition of a C 2 - n R + E 1 0 , ? C 1 - G 1 - T - P 1 0

均衡点 Equilibrium point	特征值 $λ 1$ Eigenvalue $λ 1$	特征值 $λ 2$ Eigenvalue $λ 2$	稳定性 Stability
$A 0,0$	-	-	ESS
$B 0,1$	+	+	不稳定点
$C 1,0$	+	+	不稳定点
$D 1,1$	-	-	ESS

Tab. 9 Stability analysis of equilibrium points under the condition of a C 2 - n R + E 1 0 , ? C 1 - G 1 - T - P 1 0

均衡点 Equilibrium point	特征值 $λ 1$ Eigenvalue $λ 1$	特征值 $λ 2$ Eigenvalue $λ 2$	稳定性 Stability
$A 0,0$	-	-	ESS
$B 0,1$	+	+	不稳定点
$C 1,0$	+	+	不稳定点
$D 1,1$	-	-	ESS

Fig. 4 Comparison of evolutionary paths under the benchmark model and the coordination mechanism

Fig. 5 Impact of the cost-sharing coefficient a on the behavior of tourism enterprises and ICH inheritors

Fig. 6 Impact of the penalty T on the behavior of tourism enterprises and ICH inheritors

Fig. 7 Impact of government subsidies G1 and G2 on the behavior of tourism enterprises and ICH inheritors

Fig. 8 Impact of government fines P1 and P2 on the behavior of tourism enterprise and ICH inheritors

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案例 Case	旅游企业行为 The behavior of tourism enterprises	传承人行为 The behavior of the inheritors
丹寨万达小镇 Danzhai Wanda Village	为传承人提供平台、对外宣传、举办非遗活动、订购非遗产品；用非遗元素产品装饰店铺、酒店、街道等场所	入住小镇，向企业缴纳租金；以非遗文化吸引游客，为企业增添文化色彩
西双版纳勐景来村落 Xishuangbanna Mengjinglai Village	对非遗旅游实现规范化的旅游开发，出资赞助非遗展演和傣族非遗文化陈列馆，引入新的非遗表现形式	在节庆时候策划并参加相应的活动，自发打造非遗体验场所，使全村处处皆体现出非遗文化
融水苗族自治县 Rongshui Miao Autonomous County	整合民族文化与旅游资源，挖掘消费者潜在需求，对非遗旅游资源进行综合性开发，将非遗元素融入旅游产品，提升产品附加值	为非遗旅游产品注入灵魂，形成独一无二的竞争优势，在非遗旅游融合发展中提供丰富的非遗资源、高超的技艺手法
洛阳市的洛邑古城、西安市的永兴坊、韩城市的韩城古城 Luoyi Ancient City in Luoyang City, Yongxingfang in Xi’an City, Hancheng Ancient City	丰富产品体系；通过与传承人达成合作经营、盈利分成等合作模式，实现与非遗传承人的利益共享；吸引传承人开设工作坊，与传承人共同组成非遗旅游产品的供给方	与游客互动，通过文化介绍、产品介绍、信息互动，展现文化内涵；提升对市场需求的研判准确度，通过产品创新吸引游客

案例 Case	旅游企业行为 The behavior of tourism enterprises	传承人行为 The behavior of the inheritors
丹寨万达小镇 Danzhai Wanda Village	为传承人提供平台、对外宣传、举办非遗活动、订购非遗产品；用非遗元素产品装饰店铺、酒店、街道等场所	入住小镇，向企业缴纳租金；以非遗文化吸引游客，为企业增添文化色彩
西双版纳勐景来村落 Xishuangbanna Mengjinglai Village	对非遗旅游实现规范化的旅游开发，出资赞助非遗展演和傣族非遗文化陈列馆，引入新的非遗表现形式	在节庆时候策划并参加相应的活动，自发打造非遗体验场所，使全村处处皆体现出非遗文化
融水苗族自治县 Rongshui Miao Autonomous County	整合民族文化与旅游资源，挖掘消费者潜在需求，对非遗旅游资源进行综合性开发，将非遗元素融入旅游产品，提升产品附加值	为非遗旅游产品注入灵魂，形成独一无二的竞争优势，在非遗旅游融合发展中提供丰富的非遗资源、高超的技艺手法
洛阳市的洛邑古城、西安市的永兴坊、韩城市的韩城古城 Luoyi Ancient City in Luoyang City, Yongxingfang in Xi’an City, Hancheng Ancient City	丰富产品体系；通过与传承人达成合作经营、盈利分成等合作模式，实现与非遗传承人的利益共享；吸引传承人开设工作坊，与传承人共同组成非遗旅游产品的供给方	与游客互动，通过文化介绍、产品介绍、信息互动，展现文化内涵；提升对市场需求的研判准确度，通过产品创新吸引游客